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Comments
Christopher J. Parosa*
Federalism:  Finding Meaning
Through Historical Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The rebirth of the conservative wing of the Republican Party
throughout the 1980s, culminating in the 1994 Republican
Revolution, re-familiarized the American citizenry with the con-
cepts of federalism, or the division of sovereignty between the
federal and state governments.  The rejuvenated states’ rights
mantra was typified by President Ronald Reagan’s pedagogical
rants to keep the federal government “off the backs of the Amer-
ican people,”1 and later by the Contract with America.2  The re-
newed debate gave a voice to Americans disenchanted by the
federal government’s expansion in the post-New Deal era, bring-
ing new liberalized social and economic programs into many oth-
erwise conservative states or localities.  Consequently, the
federalism debate ignited a new round of arguments by politi-
cians, academics, and judges concerning the original intent of the
Framers of the Constitution, and the instructive value of the
Tenth Amendment in particular.
The political debate surrounding federalism has its historical
* The author would like to extend gratitude to Professor Ralph J. Mooney, Uni-
versity of Oregon School of Law, Natalie Scott, and Diana Bassham for helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Comment.
1 STEPHEN J. WAYNE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 64 (2d
ed. 1997).
2 David M. Sprick, Ex Abundanti Cautela (Out of an Abundance of Caution):  A
Historical Analysis of the Tenth Amendment and the Continuing Dilemma over “Fed-
eral” Power , 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 529, 529 (1999).  The Contract with America was a
political platform created by Republicans in 1994, led by Newt Gingrich, centered
on swinging the pendulum of federalism away from the federal government, back
toward state and local governmental control. WAYNE ET AL., supra  note 1, at 71.
[119]
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-1\ORE104.txt unknown Seq: 2 11-NOV-03 9:18
120 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82, 2003]
origins in the American Revolution.  While uniform aspirations
of shedding the tyrannical cloak of the British monarchical rule
fused an American coalition during the Revolutionary War, the
inevitable consequence of success—the creation of a new govern-
ment that bound the thirteen colonial states—exposed the found-
ing generation’s “fundamentally different conclusions about what
the American Revolution meant.”3  From the implementation of
the Articles of Confederation to the creation of the secular
American Bible—the Constitution—politically incompatible no-
tions of revolutionary intentions led to the explosive and frac-
tious debates of the 1790s.4  In the wake of these polarizing
debates arose the two-party system and dichotomous atmosphere
that continues to permeate the American political establish-
ment.5  At the very heart of these ideological conflicts is federal-
ism, or, more specifically, the unresolved and mutable
determination as to what level of interaction the federal or state
governments should exercise in the lives of Americans.6
The American debate over federalism has taken a legal form
through the structural and theoretical analysis of the Constitu-
tion and its “meaning.”  This Comment will illuminate the
“Great American Debate”7 by providing a critical examination
of the historical and philosophical underpinnings of federalism
arising out of the American Revolution, focusing on the interplay
and contributions of perhaps the three most influential members
of the founding generation:  Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
and John Marshall.  This Comment aims to demonstrate that
Madison’s moderate federalism bearings constitute the most
pragmatic balance of the theoretical desires for individualism es-
poused by Jefferson and the need to employ a more functional
federal structure, as indicated in Marshall’s nationalism.  In addi-
tion, this Comment will explore the popular states’ rights refrain
3 JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS:  THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
223 (2000).
4 Id.  at 78.
5 See id.  at 15.
6 See WAYNE ET AL., supra  note 1, at 62.
7 This is simply the author’s phraseology for the federalism debate.  Federalism
has continued to be at the heart of a great many legal and political debates since the
American constitutional founding, as society struggles to determine which level of
government should have the responsibility of regulating controversial issues such as
abortion, environmental issues, firearms, minimum wages, drinking ages, and so
forth. See id.
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to the Tenth Amendment by focusing on the Amendment’s his-
torical origin, purpose, and most genuine interpretation.
Ultimately, the intent of this Comment is to echo a growing
consensus among historians dispelling the conventional expecta-
tion that the Founding Fathers acted indivisibly to establish a
government of definite design and purpose, manifested through
the Constitution.  Quite to the contrary, “[a]ny effort to analyze
this debate in the expectation of producing a definitive under-
standing of what the Constitution originally meant to Americans
at the moment of its adoption must accordingly fall short of
perfection.”8  Similarly, differing understandings of the Tenth
Amendment’s role in the constitutional system have plagued its
existence.  However, it is the author’s contention that the debate
surrounding the adoption of the Tenth Amendment clarified its
role as a mere “truism,”9 rather than as a rule of interpretation.
Temporal resolutions to the federalism debate have profound
effects on the regulation of popular and controversial issues such
as abortion, restrictions on firearms, minimum wages, environ-
mental rules, and so forth.10  The recent election of George W.
Bush, with the potential to restructure the U.S. Supreme Court
in the image of his own conservative beliefs, may revive, with
high ferocity, the partisan debate over federalism in the form of
confirmation hearings.  More importantly, it seems particularly
likely, considering the Court’s recent flirtations with reinvigo-
rating the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative restraint on fed-
eral power, that the next Supreme Court nominees will be
intimately probed for their Tenth Amendment views.  The Su-
preme Court is only “one vote away . . . from fundamentally
redefining the limits on federal power in a way that could undo
sixty years of social and economic development.”11  In that re-
gard, a nominee’s historical understanding of the federalism de-
bate and, more specifically, interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment represents a sound indicator of that nominee’s com-
mitment to federalism.  Therefore, a broader understanding of
the origins and Framers’ intent concerning federalism is critical
8 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 134 (1996).
9 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
10 WAYNE ET AL., supra  note 1, at 62.
11 Alan Brinkley, The Assault on Government , in NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS:  ES-
SAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 15, 18-19 (1997).
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in formulating an opinion that will guide legal and political minds
through the crucible that is the Great American Debate.
Part I will examine the concept of federalism at the inception
of the Constitution, focusing on the reasons for developing a new
constitutional framework and the different perspectives of those
charged with that duty.  Part II will critically analyze three very
different perspectives by crucial actors in the foundation of the
United States:  Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall.  This Comment demonstrates that in the con-
tinuum between strict individualism, advocated by Jefferson, and
a resolute adherence to nationalism, as promulgated by Justice
Marshall, James Madison’s more impartial position constitutes
the most sound expression of federalism.  Finally, Part III will
critically examine the historical debate encompassing the adop-
tion of the Tenth Amendment and the two modern legal ap-
proaches derived from it, drawing the conclusion that this
amendment fails to act as a substantive limitation on federal
power.
I
THE HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF FEDERALISM IN THE
CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
Federal Government, are few and defined.  Those which are to
remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefi-
nite.”12  Such philosophical generalities of federalism, as con-
ceived by the Founding Fathers and placed in the Constitution,
remain a structural concept of vague meaning.13  On a theoretical
level, the division of power between “two distinct governments”
enables the federal and state governments to check one another,
providing greater protection to the American people by not al-
lowing either government to become too encroaching.14  Each
sphere of sovereignty, state and federal, is to zealously guard its
realm of dominion from the aggrandizements of the other.  Ide-
ally, protection is available through a recourse to the electorate.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, more eloquent in his description of
federalism, has noted that “the Framers split the atom of sover-
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
13 See RAVOKE, supra  note 8, at 167.
14 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
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eignty . . . [so] that our citizens would have two political capaci-
ties, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by
the other.”15
The constitutional parameters of federalism are laid out in
“the enumeration of Congress’ powers in Article I, Section 8; the
undefined powers implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause;
the General Welfare Clause; the Supremacy Clause; and the
Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states ‘or to the
people.’”16  These provisions, either granting federal power over
some aspect of society or expounding on the breadth of federal
power in those areas, leave room for varying interpretations of
the extent of those powers by virtue of the vague language em-
ployed.  To relegate federalism to a hardened edict of strict for-
mulation may run contrary to the Framers’ intent, as the creation
of two competing governments, each designed to confine the
other within its appropriate domain, provide structural protec-
tion to the citizenry—“[a]mbition must be made to counteract
ambition.”17  In other words, had the Framers intended to create
a federal system with definite boundaries for the federal and
state governments, they would have implemented more exacting
terminology than applied in the vague empowerment provisions
listed above.
The conceptual origin of American federalism is located in the
Revolutionary Era.  The original thirteen British colonies consol-
idated their efforts to castigate Britain and assure their mutual
defense from outside forces seeking to capitalize on the colonies’
precarious responsibility of establishing new governments to fill
the void left by the elimination of British rule.18  The colonies,
precursors to modern states, preserved that unity through the
creation of the Articles of Confederation (“Articles”) in 1777,
ratified in 1781.19  The Articles established a confederation of the
thirteen colonies held together loosely by a weak federal govern-
ment, which was predominately charged with foreign relations
and security.20  Unfortunately, the folly of the Articles’ faith in
good governance by the states became evident almost
15 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
16 Sprick, supra  note 2, at 530.
17 Madison, supra  note 14, at 262-64.
18 See WAYNE ET AL., supra  note 1, at 33-34.
19 Id.  at 34.
20 See id.  at 35.
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immediately.21
The federal government’s inability to generate revenue or as-
semble the U.S. Congress without state approval constrained the
federal government’s ability to keep the confederation unified.22
For example, events such as Shay’s armed insurrection in Massa-
chusetts shocked leaders within the founding generation because
it exposed the potential power that organized resistance within
the states could have in weakening or utterly destroying the
fabric of unity tentatively established among the states under the
Articles.23  As such events bleakly foreshadowed the demise of
the Union, a burgeoning resolve to mute the significance of such
majoritarian revolts by expanding the powers of the federal gov-
ernment was strengthened.24  The expansion of the powers of the
federal government would limit the ability of groups aimed at
degrading the unity of the confederation by making it more ardu-
ous to organize a movement sufficient to threaten the Union’s
dissolution.25  More specifically, rather than simply commanding
a majority within a state to overthrow that state’s commitments
to the Union, an effective rebellion, under a system of height-
ened federal powers, would require a similar majority among the
people of the entire Union in order to allow enough states to
retract their adherence to federal control to dissolve the Union
through an inability to govern.26
Another concern that arose in the wake of the implementation
of the Articles was that “the strongest tendency continually be-
traying [a confederation] is the members to despoil the general
Government of its authorities,” making the federal government
incapable of defending its sphere of sovereignty from state en-
croachments.27  In other words, confederacies create central gov-
ernments that are inherently too weak to protect themselves
from destruction by the domination of the constituent members
of the confederacy.28  “[T]he experience of the ancient and mod-
ern confederacies (including their own), the shock of Shays’
21 See  Sprick, supra  note 2, at 534.
22 Id.
23 DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS:  JAMES MADISON & THE RE-
PUBLICAN LEGACY 87 (1989).
24 Id.  at 137.
25 See id.
26 Id.
27 Madison, supra  note 12, at 233.
28 See id.
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armed insurrection in Massachusetts, and . . . ‘the gross and dis-
reputable inequalities which had been prominent in the internal
administrations of most of the States,’” led many in the founding
generation to conclude that a new system, with a stronger na-
tional government, was necessary.29  Consequently, statesmen
from every state descended upon Philadelphia, in 1787, to rem-
edy the shortcomings of the Articles by constructing a new con-
stitutional framework for the Union that would feature a
stronger central government.30
The Constitution was the Framers’ attempt to satisfy the pre-
amble’s stated goal of forming “a more perfect union” than the
Articles of Confederation had formed.  From a structural per-
spective, the Framers had no viable alternative to a federal sys-
tem because the states, having preceded any centralized
American government, could not be abolished once they were
established.31  More importantly, a vast contingent of the citi-
zenry did not want the smaller, more personal state governments
to be decommissioned, because, to many Anti-Federalists, the
American Revolution was a condemnation of consolidated
power.32  Instead, these Americans believed the power of gov-
ernance had been returned to the people.33  Accordingly, as John
Marshall later noted in McCulloch v. Maryland , the legacy of
popular sovereignty was built into the constitutional structure of
American government through the promulgation of a written
constitution and the process of using ratifying conventions to
adopt it.34  Madison claimed the Constitution “[i]s to be the as-
sent and ratification of the several States, derived from the su-
preme authority in each State, the authority of the people
themselves.”35  Thus, Madison believed the Constitution was a
coordinate act of the people, merely organized by states for the
purpose of providing a forum for ratification.  This notion of pop-
ular sovereignty was later employed by the Supreme Court under
nationalist Justice John Marshall to justify the enlargement of
29 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 87.
30 See generally  Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights:  Origi-
nal Understandings, Modern Misreadings , 43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 40-42 (1998).
31 WAYNE ET AL., supra  note 1, at 47.
32 JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
266 (1996).
33 Id.  at 296.
34 17 U.S. 316, 404-05 (1819).
35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 192 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
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federal powers.36
The ratification debates in the states emphasized the volatile
and divisive nature of federalism.  In fact, the division of power
between the state and federal governments was the primary issue
threatening to impede the adoption of the Constitution.37  Al-
though the futility of the Articles was widely accepted, a sizable
contingent, the Anti-Federalists, remained committed to a more
intimate form of governance, whereby if the individual were not
the center of the governmental system, the state should remain
the principal political and legal actor.38  As a result, the Constitu-
tion represented an aversion to the spirit of the American
Revolution within Anti-Federalist ranks, because it invoked
“dread of the inevitable corruptions that result when unseen rul-
ers congregate in distant places.”39 In essence, the Anti-Federal-
ists feared the federal government’s potential for future
aggrandizement, quashing any state sovereignty.  In a similar
vein, many opponents of the Constitution were especially con-
cerned with the document’s failure to delineate a set of rights
that would protect “those freedoms that no federal government
could violate.”40  Moreover, the Anti-Federalists coalesced
around the argument that “no republican constitution could be
complete or safe unless it contained a declaration of the reserved
rights of the people, however partial or imperfect.”41
Anti-Federalist fears of federal aggrandizement constituted a
valid concern because Federalists, supporters of the Constitution,
disproportionately represented the upper crust of society, partic-
ularly with respect to wealth and education.42  By contrast, the
Anti-Federalists, and later the populist Republican Party under
Thomas Jefferson, drew “support from less elite elements of soci-
ety.”43  As the demographics suggest, the fulmination against
federal consolidation was really a fear that a new American aris-
tocracy would be erected, giving the “nobility” a stranglehold on
power.  Having tasted a new realm of freedom since the Revolu-
36 See CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE:  JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE RULE OF LAW 118 (1996).
37 See  Sprick, supra  note 2, at 533-34.
38 See , e.g. , RAKOVE, supra  note 8, at 188-91; see also ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 96.
39 ELLIS, supra  note 3, at 9.
40 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 122.
41 RAKOVE, supra  note 8, at 147.
42 JOHN F. BIBBY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 29 (4th ed.
2000).
43 Id.
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tion, citizens of the Union were reluctant to relinquish or be
divested of their newly acquired freedoms and power under pop-
ular sovereignty.
Federalists, hoping to empower the federal government in or-
der to create a cohesive union of states that would not fracture,
believed that such unity was necessary in a popular democracy to
avoid the forces of faction that would work to split the states into
distinctly separate sovereign entities.44  In fact, some politically
savvy Federalists began suggesting that the challenge of federal-
ism would be for the federal government to quell “the political
advantages the states would enjoy in commanding the loyalty of
the people,” creating a threat that the states would impose upon
the federal government’s constitutional realm of sovereignty.45
By suggesting the converse of the Anti-Federalists’ argument, the
Federalists could generate confusion as to the inevitable reper-
cussions of federalism.  This enabled them to defuse a potentially
cutting political issue within the state ratifying conventions, as
Federalists could assert that increased federal power was neces-
sary to properly bind the Union and check the otherwise limitless
power the states would possess due to the states’ favorable alle-
giance from the citizens.46  It is important to remember that the
states, having preexisted the Union in a colonial form, appeared
the natural means of defining sovereignty in the vacuum created
by the expulsion of British rule.  Moreover, citizens were familiar
with identifying themselves by colony or state, and, therefore, in
an era recognized for its castigation of consolidated government,
it seemed logical to assume citizen fidelity would reside in the
states.47
While solidifying their resolve to strengthen the federal gov-
ernment, the Federalists ultimately convinced the Anti-Federal-
ists to support the new Constitution in an attempt to remedy the
deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation.48  However, im-
plicit within the agreement to obtain such support from critical
members of the Anti-Federalist movement was the understand-
ing that a Bill of Rights would be later added to the Constitution
44 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Contemporary Relevance of The Federalist , in NEW
FEDERALIST PAPERS:  ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 8 (1997).
45 RAKOVE, supra  note 8, at 171.
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 Sprick, supra  note 2, at 533-34.
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through the amendment process.49  Federalists deemed that con-
cession inconsequential, although politically expedient toward
the end of ratification, because the federal government had not,
to their minds, been granted the power to regulate most of the
areas Anti-Federalists wanted protected in a Bill of Rights.50
Virginian Thomas Jefferson, in particular, was a catalyst for the
agreement to include a Bill of Rights as he conditioned his sup-
port for ratification upon its inclusion.51  Jefferson, notorious for
his advocacy of states’ rights, impressed upon Federalist leaders
the reality that the Framers may have failed, albeit unintention-
ally, to create a federal government based only on enumerated
powers.52  Federalists, led by another Virginian, James Madison,
perceiving the political value in Jefferson’s support for ratifica-
tion, concluded that “the Bill of Rights was needed as an addi-
tional assurance against the abuse of federal powers, by
identifying certain prohibited means to Congress’ exercise of its
legitimate ends, the enumerated powers.”53  Madison’s support
for the Bill of Rights was at least partially politically driven, as
the Federalists barely won in the Virginia ratifying convention
and Madison had to crystallize Virginia’s support if he was to be
elected to Congress from that state.54  Madison, as a Virginian,
likely recognized the novelty of avoiding conflict with those seen
as ardent protectors of Virginia’s interests, such as Jefferson.
Consequently, Madison not only supported the supplementation
of the Constitution with a Bill of Rights, despite believing it
largely unnecessary, he also drafted and proposed the amend-
ments that eventually became the Bill of Rights in the First
Congress.55
The ratification debates, and more specifically the debate over
the proper balance of sovereignty under federalism, exposed a
great political divide that has marked American government ever
since.  In the 1790s, after ratification placed the duty of creating a
new government in the past, the political division became a hard-
49 Id.
50 Peter A. Lauricella, The Real “Contract with America:”  The Original Intent of
the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause , 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377, 1391 (1997).
51 See ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 123-24.
52 David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court’s Rediscovery
of the Tenth Amendment , 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 348 (1996).
53 Id.  at 349.
54 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 89.
55 ELLIS, supra  note 3, at 53.
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ened ideological dichotomy.56  Sadly, differing views of the
American Revolution’s meaning led to the digression of “[t]he
political dialogue within the highest echelon of the revolutionary
generation,” producing “a decade-long shouting match.”57  To
those who championed the rights of the states, led by Thomas
Jefferson, the 1790s were a betrayal of the revolutionary fervor
of popular sovereignty espoused in the 1770s, because the federal
government moved to assume powers that they felt were re-
served to the states.58
These Republicans, as they came to be known, pointed to the
George Washington administration’s fiscal policies, as fashioned
by Alexander Hamilton, as the ultimate betrayal of revolutionary
principles.59  For instance, Hamilton’s policy included a measure
to assume state debts arising from the Revolutionary War.60  This
proposal incensed Republicans, who believed it to be a blatant
step toward federal aggrandizement because it would create an
obvious need for the federal government to employ its taxation
power to alleviate the debt assumed.61  After all, taxation was
seen by many then as it is seen by many today, a means of exert-
ing control.62  Nevertheless, for the Federalist Party, the Republi-
cans’ adversary, the 1790s allowed America to begin to shake out
the rhetorical flights of idealism that were customary in reference
to the Revolution, expressing a near complete devotion to indi-
vidual rights, from the practical operation of government found
in the progression towards nationalism.  Specifically, the 1790s
saw the federal government begin to attain the level of power
that many Federalists believed was both necessary and mani-
fested by the discharge of the Articles in favor of the
Constitution.
In the tumultuous period following the American Revolution,
in which differing ideals for a popular democracy were exposed
within the founding generation, arose the dichotomies that have
encompassed American society ever since:  Federalist or Repub-
lican; nationalist or individualist; liberal or conservative.63  Pro-
56 Id.  at 16.
57 Id.
58 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 304.
59 Id.  at 145.
60 ELLIS, supra  note 3, at 48.
61 See ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 155.
62 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819).
63 See ELLIS, supra  note 3, at 15.
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fessor Joseph J. Ellis contends that these dichotomies arose from
the Framers’ different views as to when America truly exper-
ienced her founding moment.64  Those of the Republican persua-
sion, Ellis believes, were consumed by the theory of
individualism and the disposal of a powerful central government
far from the citizen and the citizen’s immediate community.65
This notion of individualism was prevalent in 1776, as evidenced
by the idealistic language of nearly inexhaustible freedom pre-
sent in the Declaration of Independence.66  On the other hand,
Federalists, conscious of the structural frustrations caused by the
Articles of Confederation, discussed above, sought to manipulate
the balance of federalism to pragmatically resolve the shortcom-
ings of individualism.67  Professor Ellis notes that an enhanced
sense of nationalism marked the constitutional founding in 1787
and 1788.68  Regardless, two dominant ideological paradigms to-
ward federalism emerged from this era:  the states’ rights view, as
articulated by Jefferson, and the nationalist view, as espoused by
Justice John Marshall.  These vanguard members of the founding
generation, with the addition of James Madison’s more moderate
position, provide an illuminating panorama of the varying per-
spectives on federalism and dispel any notion that there exists a
uniform original intent that can guide modern decisions on feder-
alism issues.
II
THREE FOUNDING VIEWS ON THE ROLE
OF FEDERALISM
Within the founding generation there are, arguably, no three
more important figures than Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
and Chief Justice John Marshall.  Jefferson played the role of lit-
erary craftsman and lead political statesmen for formation of a
government predicated upon individual rights.69  In fact, Jeffer-
son is accredited with the most poignant articulations of personal
freedoms as an imperative to democratic societies.70  James
Madison was perhaps the most adept and pragmatic tactician in
64 Id.  at 9.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id.
68 Id.  at 8.
69 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 11.
70 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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the founding generation.71  Madison’s eminent political intelli-
gence enabled him to construct a constitutional framework that
gingerly straddled application as a consolidated nation and a con-
federation of sovereign states.72  Essentially, the Constitution
was an attempt to provide the citizens of the various states the
maximum amount of personal freedom while preserving cohe-
sion to the Union.73  John Marshall, on the other hand, had the
unenviable task of transforming “the constitutional framework
into the reality of decided cases.”74  In that endeavor, Marshall
employed a nationalist sentiment that challenged the doctrine of
states’ rights and provided precedent for expanding federal pow-
ers.75  Through examination of these three American pioneers it
is possible not only to determine the origins of the contemporary
federalism debate, but also to understand the strengths and
weaknesses of individualism and nationalism at the time of
founding.
A. Thomas Jefferson
On one extreme of mainstream political thought during the
founding generation sat Thomas Jefferson.  Jefferson’s public
pronouncements on individual liberty and disparagement of the
intrusive effects of the Constitution on state governance made
him the discernable leader of a populist movement that remained
salient following the American Revolution.76  A genius as a rhet-
orician and visionary, evidenced in his drafting of the Declara-
tion of Independence, Jefferson captivated the imagination of
large segments of the population that yearned for a justification
for fighting the Revolutionary War and were committed to the
individual empowerment it promised.77
Jefferson’s thoughts, however, were more impressive theoreti-
cally than they were in practice.78  In fact, he was often incapable
of differentiating idealistic perception from a pragmatic political
reality, as evidenced by Madison’s efforts to harness Jefferson’s
71 RAKOVE, supra  note 8, at 37.
72 Id.  at 168.
73 See id.
74 Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars:  The Ten Greatest Justices , 31
TULSA L.J. 93, 95 (1995).
75 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 148.
76 See ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 266.
77 See id.  at 46.
78 Id.  at 164.
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extemporaneous solutions long enough to explain, and often dis-
avow, their practical application in the American constitutional
system.79  Nonetheless, when Jefferson, the trusted literary
craftsman famed for showing his democratic convictions through
populous rhetoric, warned of a potential infringement on their
newly acquired freedoms, people listened.  For example, Jeffer-
son stated:
I see, . . . and with the deepest affliction, the rapid strides with
which the federal branch of our Government is advancing to-
ward the usurpation of all the rights reserved to the States,
and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and do-
mestic; and that too, by constructions which, if legitimate,
leave no limits to their power.80
The American penchant for dichotomy was embodied in Jef-
ferson’s struggle to cope with the moral dichotomies that stewed
in his mind.81  These dichotomies led Jefferson to become an ar-
dent partisan, convinced that those who were his political oppo-
nents were “apostates and heretics and traitors to the cause of
American Independence.”82  Unfortunately, the predilection to
view the world in simplistic dichotomies caused Jefferson to con-
fuse nationalist attempts to make a more cohesive band of states
with the desire to preserve a British-styled monarchy.83  The in-
ability to conceive of differing means of employing democracy
pushed Jefferson to the dramatic conclusion that those opposed
to his expansive support for individual liberties and control were
evil.  As a result, he tended to ignore the historical lesson pro-
vided by the failure of the Articles of Confederation that a
stronger federal government was necessary to preserve the
Union.
The true spirit of the American Revolution remained clear to
Jefferson, “[m]y general plan would be, to make the States one as
to everything connected with foreign nations, and several as to
everything purely domestic.”84  Despite such a succinct descrip-
79 Id.  at 131-32.
80 THOMAS JEFFERSON, On States Rights:  Letter to William B. Giles  (Dec. 26,
1825), in LETTERS AND ADDRESSES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 287, 287 (William B.
Parker & Jonas Viles eds., 1905).
81 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 191.
82 Id.
83 See id.  at 305.
84 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Division of Authority in Government:  Letter to Edward
Carrington  (Aug. 4, 1787), in LETTERS AND ADDRESSES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra  note 80 at 63.
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tion of federalism’s proper application, it neglects the philosophi-
cal beliefs that belie his understanding of democracy.  To
Jefferson, the message of contemporary writers such as John
Locke demarcated government’s prudent end, namely that the
government that governs least governs best.85  This vision be-
came transposed in the minds of many within the founding gen-
eration, Jefferson in particular, symbolizing the true meaning of
the American Revolution.86  Consolidated power was to be de-
stroyed to return power to the people.87
While a desire for popular sovereignty was hardly objectiona-
ble to the vast majority of revolutionary Americans, Jefferson’s
idealism carried individualism to what seemed an absurd ex-
treme.88  Instead of advocating the mere rollback of consolidated
power, Jefferson sought to limit governmental power alto-
gether.89  Professor Joseph J. Ellis claims “his mind and heart
longed for a world where government itself disappeared.”90  Not
surprisingly, the more practical element of the founding genera-
tion failed to take the idealistic leap of believing such a world
was possible.  To many, if taken to fruition, a total lack of govern-
ance appeared to be “a recipe for anarchy.”91  Fortunately for
Jefferson, and perhaps American society, his personal correspon-
dence with James Madison exposed the fallacies that Jefferson’s
arguments embraced prior to their publicity.92  This offered Jef-
ferson a chance for clarity and revision.  By deconstructing the
impractical components of Jefferson’s theoretical government,
Madison helped his compatriot charter a course toward individ-
ual liberation that encompassed the tangibility of human nature
and history.93  Furthermore, in matters concerning the Constitu-
tion, “Jefferson deferred to Madison’s superior judgment. . . .”94
Jefferson’s staunch support for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights
to the Constitution demonstrated his skepticism of both the al-
leged confinement of federal powers to those distinctly enumer-
ated and, more generally, the desire to expand federal control
85 See ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 119.
86 See id.  at 266.
87 Id.  at 119.
88 Id.
89 Id.  at 354.
90 Id.  at 124.
91 Id.  at 11.
92 See MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 45.
93 See id.
94 ELLIS, supra  note 3, at 66.
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over the states and their people.95  In Jefferson’s mind, an ener-
getic federal government would violate the original intentions of
the Revolution; thus, Jefferson aimed to limit federal expansion
to only those powers specifically created to remedy the perceived
deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation.96  Accordingly, the
focal point of Jefferson’s constitutional interpretation became
the Tenth Amendment’s apparent articulation of the enumerated
powers doctrine, as incorporated into the Constitution through
the adoption of the Bill of Rights.  In fact, even prior to the
adoption of the Tenth Amendment Jefferson declared:
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this
ground:  That “all powers not delegated to the United States,
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States or to the people.”  To take a single step
beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the pow-
ers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of
power, no longer susceptible of any definition.97
Therefore, Jefferson suggested that federal powers should be
limited to those “expressly” identified within the text of the Con-
stitution.  However, this position stands in stark contrast to both
the prevailing understanding of the Tenth Amendment as it was
eventually adopted and Jefferson’s subsequent acknowledgement
of the need for implied powers.  Further explanation of the his-
torical debate surrounding the meaning of the Tenth Amend-
ment is warranted and provided in Part III.
Jefferson was forced to concede that the expansive language of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8, importing
the notion of implied powers into the Constitution, inherently
cast doubt on the ability to define precise boundaries to which
the federal government must adhere.98  Nevertheless, Jefferson
submitted his own interpretation of the Clause by stating that
“only the means which are ‘necessary’ not those which are
merely ‘convenient’ for effecting the enumerated powers” were
allowed.99  In order to qualify as “necessary” the federal action
had to constitute a “means without which the grant of power
95 See ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 122.
96 See id.
97 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank  (Feb.
15, 1791), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:  WRITINGS 416, 416 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984).
98 See  Mayer, supra  note 52, at 354-55.
99 Id.
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would be nugatory.”100  Still, even limiting federal powers to
those explicitly enumerated, when viewed in conjunction with
the Necessary and Proper Clause, makes Jefferson’s hope of cre-
ating a finite “field of power” problematic.
The federal expansion of the 1790s, and Treasury Secretary Al-
exander Hamilton’s fiscal policy in particular, pushed Jefferson,
and even numerous political moderates, like Madison, to long for
a return to the individualistic principles that they believed
marked the Revolution.101  Hence, Jefferson deemed his election
to the presidency as a popular call for return to the philosophies
of the American Revolution, thus giving him a mandate to re-
duce federal intrusion.102  As a result, the “Revolution of 1800,”
as it became known, was a revolution of the doctrine of federal-
ism.103  Society had rallied around Jeffersonian ideals and placed
Republicans in charge of fulfilling those ideals.  Ironically, the
“Revolution of 1800” had one very salient, and somewhat unex-
pected, result, the societal shift toward populism caused the Bill
of Rights to protect minority rights from the majority’s encroach-
ment, rather than protecting states from the federal government
as Jefferson had intended.104  More importantly, it set a prece-
dent that the bounds of federalism were to be determined at the
ballot box.
B. James Madison
In his essays supporting the ratification of the Constitution,
James Madison explained, “The powers delegated by the pro-
posed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and de-
fined.  Those which are to remain in the State Governments are
numerous and indefinite.”105  On its face and in its spirit, this
statement attests to Jefferson’s basic understanding of a limited
federal government.  However, the significance of the statement
in ascertaining the original intent of both the founding genera-
tion and of Madison himself has been dramatically overstated in
debates on federalism.  States’ rights advocates have manipulated
Madison’s statements to imply that the Framers meant to
100 JEFFERSON, supra  note 97, at 419.
101 ELLIS, supra  note 3, at 14.
102 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 220.
103 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 91.
104 Id.
105 Madison, supra  note 12, at 236.
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subordinate the federal government to the states.106  Unfortu-
nately, this interpretation ignores both the historical context in
which the statement was set, and ignores Madison’s more com-
plete and complex articulations of the proper end of federalism.
Although Madison expressed a strong desire to establish a lim-
ited federal government, his fear of creating a constitutional sys-
tem plagued by the same debilitating deficiencies as the Articles
of Confederation, namely an impotent federal government, “in-
clined him to err on the side of giving the Union ‘all the neces-
sary means’ to secure ‘the safety, liberty, and happiness of the
Community.’”107
To understand James Madison is to recognize that his “political
intelligence was eminently pragmatic.”108  Madison’s contribu-
tions to the creation and ratification of the Constitution were not
the postulates of a reclusive political theorist, but the practical
solutions of a veteran legislator who had observed firsthand the
inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation.109  In fact, the na-
tionalist views Madison exhibited during the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787, and subsequent debates over ratification, were
not only cultivated from his immense historical knowledge of
prior societies, but also from his service in Congress under the
Articles of Confederation.110  This early legislative experience
taught Madison that “Congress lacked the authority and re-
sources to carry out even its existing duties.”111
Madison’s constitutional desire was to “extend the sphere of
republican government from the state level, where it was work-
ing so poorly, to the federal level, where majority factions were
less likely to form and be oppressive. . . .”112  Madison recognized
that the Articles of Confederation had demonstrated that al-
lowing states to exercise nearly exclusive control over domestic
issues enabled factions to rise to prominence within the states,
guiding state policies toward solely state ends.113  This inevitably
led the citizenry to demonstrate total devotion to the states, due
106 See  Mayer, supra  note 52, at 353-54.
107 RAKOVE, supra  note 8, at 169.
108 Id.  at 37.
109 Id.  at 46.
110 Id.  at 38.
111 Id.
112 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 43.
113 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43-44 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed.,
1982).
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to the states’ ability to more immediately gratify the needs of
local communities, while sacrificing the aggregate interests of the
nation at large.114  Consequently, Madison aimed to create a fed-
eral system that would equitably balance state and federal inter-
ests.  To this end, Madison believed “the central achievement of
the constitutional settlement of 1787-1788” was “to grant the fed-
eral government sufficient sovereignty to assure a national sys-
tem of laws that all states and all individuals were obliged to
obey.”115
Beyond simply liberating the Union from its oppressive depen-
dence on the states, Madison envisioned the Constitutional Con-
vention as an opportunity to design a federal government that
could rectify the innate defects that were stymieing the states.116
This nationalist goal, containing paternalistic qualities, was best
demonstrated by Madison’s proposal to bestow in the Constitu-
tion a federal veto power over state policies and legislation.117
While a federal veto power was never adopted, the federal gov-
ernment was given vast extensions of power through the broad
language of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supremacy
Clause, and other language in the Constitution.  Madison justi-
fied the expansive grants of power to the federal government,
fundamentally changing the structural design of the Articles of
Confederation, by depending upon the structural protections cre-
ated within the Constitution, such as separation of powers and
reliance on the electoral process.118
Madison forthrightly believed in the structure of American
government.119  As a result, the appropriate remedy, in
Madison’s mind, for federal aggrandizement was the democratic
process.120  In other words, the electoral process is the structural
mechanism employed by the Constitution to alleviate abuses of
federal power.121  To Madison, the genius of this solution is that
it affords government the ability to change with the times, re-
sponding to the evolution of societal needs.122  Furthermore, reli-
114 Id.
115 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 333.
116 RAKOVE, supra  note 8, at 47.
117 Id.  at 51.
118 Id.  at 199.
119 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 127.
120 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 230 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
121 Id.
122 See MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 87.
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ance on the democratic process is a valid means of determining
the proper balance of federalism, as if “the people should in the
future become more partial to the federal than to the State gov-
ernments, . . . the people ought not surely be precluded from
giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be
most due.”123  By this standard, federalism should be permitted
to expand and contract according to societal desire.  Addition-
ally, Madison believed the states’ responsibility is to notify the
citizenry when federal encroachment becomes problematic or
impermissible.124  Essentially, Madison encouraged competition
between states and federal governmental officials within the pub-
lic arena, because it affords the citizenry greater information con-
cerning the proper distribution of power under federalism.125
Clearly, a citizenry of elevated public awareness is virtuous in a
democratic society predicated upon the electoral process.
Madison’s conception of a politicized federalism, with its
boundaries defined at the ballot box, demonstrated his rejection
of textualism.  He believed a formalistic approach of adhering
solely to the explicit language of the Constitution would prove
untenable because the meaning of words change, causing the
meaning of the Constitution to change.126  Thus, instead of creat-
ing a noxious and inflexible framework for constitutional inter-
pretation, Madison preferred a method by which modifications
could be made when necessary.  This allowed those charged with
interpreting the Constitution the ability to refer to history and
precedent, the touchstones of constitutional interpretation ac-
cording to Madison, in order to render prudent decisions.127  Ul-
timately, Madison tried to balance the need for stability in
government with the notion of letting man govern himself.128  By
yielding to societal changes through the use of the democratic
process, as evidenced by the amendment process, the founding
generation’s great accomplishment was to structurally formalize,
in the Constitution, a stable governmental system that provides
for the evolution of society.  Upon this conception of the Consti-
tution, Justice John Marshall’s famed declaration that “we must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding” finds
123 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 238-39 (James Madison) (Garry Willis ed., 1982).
124 Madison, supra  note 120, at 230.
125 See id.
126 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 78.
127 Id.  at 82.
128 See id.  at 52.
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footing.129
Historical descriptions of James Madison as a devoted archi-
tect of and partisan for Jeffersonian democracy130 drastically
oversimplify the political ideals of a man who had a principal role
in constructing the broad language in the Constitution that ena-
bled federal expansion.  In fact, Madison’s “arguments for a for-
tified national government became the centerpiece around which
all the compromises and revisions of the eventual document con-
gealed, giving him the honorary title of ‘Father of the Constitu-
tion.’”131  He emphasized the historical foundations for the
Constitution, particularly the failure of the Articles of Confeder-
ation, to support greater federal powers.132  Even so, Madison
“did not construe his conservative quest for stability, . . . , as in
any sense unrepublican or inimical to the spirit of the American
Revolution.”133
Madison’s apparent vacillations concerning federalism, advo-
cating nationalist views during the creation and ratification of the
Constitution and then supporting individualism from the 1790s
forward, has caused him to be misunderstood and maligned by
history.134  Many of his contemporaries, factions on both sides of
the federalism debate, charged him with deviating from the core
principles of the American Revolution and Constitution.  But, in-
stead of changing his views, as many historians have been prone
to assume, Madison was simply a political moderate stranded in a
period of American history where political divisions were mani-
fest and extremely polarizing.  While Madison supported the ex-
pansion of federal powers at the constitutional founding, society
continued to progress down a path of federal expansion, and, at
some point along that continuum, Madison could simply no
longer follow politically.135  Moreover, Madison’s political transi-
tion from a moderate nationalist to a moderate individualist rep-
resents the consummate affirmation of his belief in the political
process as the proper conduit for determining the scope of feder-
129 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
130 Jeffersonian Democracy emphasized a devotion to individualism and personal
freedom from governmental intrusion. See supra  notes 80-86 and accompanying
text.
131 ELLIS, supra  note 3, at 52.
132 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 127.
133 Id.  at 52.
134 See id.  at 89.
135 See id.  at 127.
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alism.  Observing a continuous move towards federal domination
of American government, Madison was allowed to shift his alle-
giance to the political ideology most representative of his federal-
ism beliefs, without the restriction of constitutionally
predetermined boundaries.
C. John Marshall
If Thomas Jefferson’s individualism was on one polar extreme
of the founding generation’s political gradation, Chief Justice
John Marshall’s nationalism was firmly stationed on the other.
The fiercest of rivals, Marshall, as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, was the highest of the impetuous judicial appointments
made by President John Adams just prior to Jefferson’s inaugu-
ration.136  Jefferson correctly interpreted Adams’s actions as an
attempt to preserve Federalist control of the judiciary.137  As a
result, Jefferson resented the fact that “a small remnant of die-
hard Federalists was manipulating its tenacious hold on the judi-
ciary—the only branch of the federal government protected from
the will of this Jeffersonian majority—to further its evil de-
signs.”138  Although distant cousins, misunderstandings between
the two pivotal leaders were likely inevitable, as Jefferson’s pre-
dilection for envisioning the world as a series of strict dichoto-
mies was simply inconsistent with Marshall’s pragmatic
conceptualization of varying shades of gray.139
John Marshall is a cornerstone in American law.140  The Mar-
shall Court, simply by virtue of being the first to consider contro-
versial issues of federalism, had the responsibility of molding
amorphous constitutional provisions into guiding principles of
law.141  In that endeavor, the Marshall Court’s path-breaking de-
cisions were inevitable.142  Moreover, Marshall belonged to both
the founding generation and the “subsequent generation that
gave shape and substance to the Constitution,” which enabled
him to incorporate and manipulate the major political philoso-
phies that emerged during the Revolutionary Era and constitu-
136 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 209.
137 Id.
138 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 69.
139 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 207-08.
140 See  Schwartz, supra  note 74, at 95.
141 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 138.
142 Id.
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tional founding.143  Therefore, an examination of Marshall’s
perception of federalism can provide insight into both the theory
behind early constitutional jurisprudence on federalism and a
countervailing view of Jeffersonian Democracy, as Marshall was
a key voice in the nationalism movement at that time.144
Perhaps Marshall’s most valuable talent was his seemingly be-
guiling ability to persuade others.145  Jefferson considered Mar-
shall the only person that he could not “outduel in behind-the-
scenes political fighting.”146  In fact, Jefferson admitted in one
humorous, yet poignant, declaration on Marshall:
So sure as you admit any position to be good, no matter how
remote from the conclusion he seeks to establish, you are
gone.  So great is his sophistry you must never give him an
affirmative answer or you will be forced to grant his conclu-
sion.  Why if he were to ask me if it were daylight or not, I’d
reply, “Sir, I don’t know, I can’t tell.”147
Marshall’s celebrated intellectual eminence often allowed him
to arrive at the conclusion he desired, as he could simultaneously
“grasp a subject in its entirety and . . . analyze its constituent
parts and understand their relation to the whole” on complex
constitutional issues.148  This mental agility led many to charge
that he would reach tentative conclusions on reason or principle,
then look for law to support that view.149  Moreover, Marshall’s
more brilliant decisions would seem directed toward the position
of his adversaries, only to double back cunningly and resolve the
case on contrary grounds.150  Jefferson called this tactic
“twistification.”151
Beyond their personal objections with one another, the Jeffer-
son and Marshall feud was predicated upon ideology.  Clearly,
the most salient discrepancy between Jefferson and Marshall, an
individualist and nationalist respectively, remained their differing
views concerning the division of government power.  For in-
stance, Marshall indignantly rejected the doctrine of states’
143 Id.  at ix.
144 Id.  at 5.
145 Id.  at 16.
146 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 264.
147 Id.
148 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 15.
149 Id.  at 183.
150 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 208.
151 Id.
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rights, a fundamental principle of Jeffersonian democracy.152
States’ rights advocates posited that the Constitution forged a
confederation of states, where the states were the constituent
parties.153  Under this logic, the states “surrendered only that
portion of their sovereignty necessary for the general govern-
ment to carry out its expressly enumerated national purposes.”154
Marshall deemed the confederation theory antithetical to the
doctrine of popular sovereignty, which was the actual foundation
for the Constitution’s authority.155  In his view, the argument that
“the states preceded and created the Union,” therefore retaining
inherent powers that the federal government could never
supercede, confounded the fundamental truths of the American
Revolution.156  While Marshall recognized areas of reserved state
powers, he viewed the Constitution as a collective act of the peo-
ple, reflecting their conscious and deliberate repudiation of the
league of states under the Articles of Confederation.157  Thus,
the state ratifying conventions were merely the constitutionally
chosen venues to facilitate that manifestation.  Marshall consid-
ered Jefferson and his Republican compatriots as people set to
denigrate the Union by reverting it back to its failed confederate
past, rather than promoting a unified nation.158
Popular sovereignty formed the foundation for Marshall’s im-
plemented conception of constitutional nationalism, which was
buttressed by the Constitution’s recognition of national
supremacy.159  Under the doctrine of constitutional nationalism,
Marshall maintained that the federal government’s powers
should be broadly construed to “enable [the] government to op-
erate effectively in performing its great national objects.”160
Consequently, the Marshall Court emphatically held that any
enumerated power provided the federal government plenary au-
thority.161  In fact, in one of Marshall’s more irradiant articula-
tions of the federal government’s primacy, he asserted “[l]et the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
152 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 148.
153 Id.  at 112.
154 Id.
155 Id.  at 114.
156 RAKOVE, supra  note 8, at 163.
157 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 114.
158 ELLIS, supra  note 32, at 303.
159 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 111.
160 Id.  at 113.
161 Sprick, supra  note 2, at 559.
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and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”162  Essentially,
the Marshall Court sowed the legal seed of nationalism by weav-
ing it into constitutional law.
The transition of federalism from a political debate, arbitrated
through the electorate, into legalistic debate, resolved by the ju-
diciary, unnerved Republicans.  That anxiety seemed justified
considering the Federalist domination of the federal judiciary
and the Marshall Court’s overt nationalist tendencies.  Also, the
broad judicial discretion employed by the Marshall Court on is-
sues of constitutional law concerned vigilant Republicans, ever
the protectorates of state powers, because decisions lacking tex-
tual explanations appeared to constitute judicial legislation.163
However, “Marshall’s task was to translate the constitutional
framework into the reality of decided cases.”164  Accordingly, the
Chief Justice wrote on a clean slate, allowing him to make path-
breaking decisions simply by virtue of being the first to consider
particular constitutional issues.165
In constructing this body of precedent through litigated cases,
Marshall viewed his endorsement of national supremacy as “a
conservative and defensive constitutional principle to enable the
general government to freely exercise its limited powers and to
resist state encroachment on its jurisdiction.”166  In other words,
Marshall tried to integrate what he perceived to be the core les-
son seized from the revolutionary era into constitutional doc-
trine, which was the principle of collectivism, a “virtuous
surrender of personal, state, and sectional interests to the larger
purpose of American nationhood.”167
Today, many of Marshall’s beliefs continue to permeate Amer-
ican constitutional doctrine and the federalism debate.  For ex-
ample, Marshall’s enterprise to write the implied powers doctrine
into constitutional law afforded President Roosevelt, during the
New Deal Era, the flexibility Madison had originally intended
the federal government to enjoy.168  As a result, Marshall en-
162 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
163 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 49.
164 Schwartz, supra  note 74, at 95.
165 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 138.
166 Id.  at 122.
167 ELLIS, supra  note 3, at 14.
168 See  Sprick, supra  note 2, at 536.
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sured the Constitution would thwart the deficiencies that af-
flicted the Articles of Confederation, namely, a weak federal
government.169
III
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF THE
TENTH AMENDMENT
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”
—Tenth Amendment, ratified in 1791
As previously noted, the burgeoning power of the federal gov-
ernment in the twentieth century, particularly through the ex-
panded application of the Commerce Clause, has reinvigorated
advocates of states’ rights in their cries for reform.  Specifically,
states’ rights advocates desire a return of many of the responsi-
bilities assumed by the federal government in recent decades to
the state and local governments, also known as devolution feder-
alism.170  Not surprisingly, those advocates have selected the
Tenth Amendment as their mechanism for employing devolution
federalism.171
Further, the conservative dominance of the current Supreme
Court has led many within states’ rights circles to expect a trium-
phant importation of the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on
federal powers.172  The Court itself has provided validity to that
expectation over the last few decades, as it has “increasingly re-
vived a judicial solicitude for antifederalism.”173  Moreover, Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas’s dissent in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton174 unmistakably called for utilization of the Tenth
Amendment as a rule for constitutional interpretation.175  This
reactionary measure, designed to check federal expansions that
169 See RAKOVE, supra  note 8, at 38.
170 WAYNE ET AL., supra  note 1, at 71.
171 See id.  at 72.
172 See  Mayer, supra  note 52, at 388.
173 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115
(14th ed. 2001).
174 514 U.S. 779, 847-48 (1995).  Justice Thomas’s lengthy dissent specifies that
“[w]here the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power—that is,
where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion—the Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it.” Id.  at 848.
175 Mayer, supra  note 52, at 343.
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transcend their alleged constitutional confines, promotes the de-
velopment of the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limitation
on federal power.176
As commonly noted, the federal government’s power over the
states, predominately exerted under the Commerce Clause, has
become essentially plenary.177  Consequently, courts are required
to search beyond the constitutionally enumerated federal powers
to determine what powers have been reserved to the states,
which inevitably leads to the accusation of judicial legislation.178
While states’ rights advocates beseech the use of the Tenth
Amendment as the touchstone of constitutional interpretation,179
at least one Founding Father, James Madison, believed constitu-
tional interpretation should be guided by history and prece-
dent.180  Accordingly, no meaning can be read into the Tenth
Amendment without adequate understanding of the political and
historical context in which it was derived.  By examining the de-
bates surrounding the proposal and ratification of the Tenth
Amendment it becomes evident that there was no universal de-
sign upon its inception.  To the contrary, although Anti-Federal-
ists generally sought to include a provision to ensure the
encapsulation of the federal government within its enumerated
powers, the Federalists crippled that objective by stripping the
Tenth Amendment of the language necessary to provide affirma-
tive protection.181  Instead, Federalists, led by Madison, espoused
the intent to recognize implied federal powers.182  Part III will
critically analyze the historical debate surrounding the adoption
of the Tenth Amendment, as well as the two competing legal the-
ories derived from the amendment.  Ultimately, this Part will
conclude that the Tenth Amendment was simply a political en-
ticement for Anti-Federalist support of the Constitution, but
lacking any substantive force.
A. Historical Background
As previously noted, when final ratification of the proposed
176 Id.
177 Joseph Lipner, Imposing Federal Business on Officers of the States:  What the
Tenth Amendment Might Mean , 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907, 912 (1989).
178 See id.
179 Mayer, supra  note 52, at 343.
180 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 82.
181 See  Lauricella, supra  note 50, at 1392.
182 See  Madison, supra  note 120, at 228-229.
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Constitution became tenuous in the state ratifying conventions,
Federalists began contemplating potential political compromises
that could be made with Anti-Federalists.  Coalesced around a
desire for a Bill of Rights and doubting the sufficiency of implied
limitations on federal powers, the Anti-Federalists posed a sub-
stantial threat to the ratification of the new government.183  More
specifically, the broad language of the Necessary and Proper and
General Welfare clauses incited fears in Anti-Federalists of po-
tential federal encroachment on the states.184  Recognizing the
opportunity to forge an agreement, Federalists implicitly con-
sented to the future supplementation, through the amendment
process, of a list of unassailable rights that the federal govern-
ment could not infringe upon.185
Many Federalists deemed the compromise for a Bill of Rights
harmless because the Constitution’s enumeration of powers
granted exclusive powers to the national government, providing
“an appropriate context in which to apply the traditional com-
mon law maxim of expressio unius est exclusion alterius-–the in-
clusion of such a list of powers logically excludes others.”186  In
other words, the federal government was inherently powerless to
take action in areas where the Constitution failed to grant it
power.187  As a result, the First Congress, honoring the tacit
agreement, superintended the proposal and debate of a compila-
tion of amendments suggested in the state conventions.188  The
premise of the Tenth Amendment was so popular that it was the
only supplemental measure requested by every state ratifying
convention that proposed amendments.189
The proposal that was to become the Tenth Amendment was
not of new design, rather it was modeled after Article II of the
Articles of Confederation.190  Article II declared that the states
retained “every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly  delegated to the United States . . . .”191
183 See  McAffee, supra  note 30, at 39.
184 Mayer, supra  note 52, at 346.
185 Sprick, supra  note 2, at 533-34.
186 McAffee, supra  note 30, at 33.
187 See  Mayer, supra  note 52, at 345.
188 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECON-
STRUCTION 123 (1998).
189 Id.
190 Mayer, supra  note 52, at 348.
191 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II, repealed by U.S. CONST. (emphasis
added).
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However, the amendment Congress proposed to promulgate,
drafted by James Madison, neglected to adopt the term “ex-
pressly.”192  Many Anti-Federalists objected to the missing term,
as the word “expressly” provided the vernacular teeth to the
amendment by requiring that any potential federal action ema-
nate directly from a specific enumeration within the Constitu-
tion.193  In fact, during the debate over the adoption of the Tenth
Amendment, Representative Thomas Tudor Tucker of South
Carolina proposed to amend the version Madison had submitted
by including the word “expressly.”194  Madison protested, citing
arguments that would later prove the foundation for expanding
the implied powers of the federal government, mainly Congress,
to its modern dimension.195
To Madison, it was “unwise and impossible to attempt to ‘con-
fine a Government to the exercise of express powers’ and . . .
necessary to allow for ‘powers of implication.’”196  Essentially,
the Tenth Amendment could remain congruent with the Framers’
intentions to eradicate the problems plaguing the Articles of
Confederation if the words “expressly” or “clearly” were not in-
corporated as limitations on the federal government.197  Such
limitations would negate the existence of implied powers, which
Madison believed indispensable because “[w]ithout the sub-
stance of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead
letter.”198  Madison, in contemplation of the Constitution’s ratifi-
cation, had insisted that “[n]o axiom is more clearly established
in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the
means authorised [sic]; wherever a general power to do a thing is
given, every particular power necessary for doing it, is
included.”199
The recognition of implied powers was a necessity because the
federal government had to have the ability to employ the means
required to effectuate its enumerated powers.  In addition, it was
imperative that the ability to select the means be pliable in order
to allow the federal government to use its constitutional powers
192 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
193 See  Sprick, supra  note 2, at 535-36.
194 Lauricella, supra  note 50, at 1392.
195 See  Lipner, supra  note 177, at 923.
196 Lauricella, supra  note 50, at 1392.
197 Sprick, supra  note 2, at 536.
198 Madison, supra  note 120, at 228.
199 Id.  at 229-30.
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effectively under varying and changing circumstances.200  To em-
brace the word “expressly” was to “chain[ ] the federal govern-
ment to a miserly interpretation of its enumerated powers.”201
After all, the implied powers were the source of constitutional
flexibility Madison intended the federal government to have to
prevent its futility, as witnessed under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.202  Also, to have constitutionally named all the powers the
federal government would possess would simply have been too
cumbersome,203 and inevitably would have “proven unavoidably
negligent in predicting the circumstances and needs that the fu-
ture would produce.”204
In acknowledgment of the popular support for a reserved pow-
ers amendment, Madison declared that although the amendment
“may be considered superfluous,” there could “be no harm in
making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is
as stated.”205  The “fact” Madison refers to is the existence of
implied powers.206  Hence, the Tenth Amendment was a literal
statement of a fact Madison thought obvious:  those powers not
granted to the federal government, explicitly or implicitly, would
be retained by those who empowered the federal government to
begin with, the citizenry.207  Under this rendering, the Tenth
Amendment was to be more symbolic than controlling.208
It was upon this conception of the Tenth Amendment that
John Marshall, then a member of the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion, recognized that “[t]he men who drew and adopted this
amendment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from
the insertion of this word [expressly] in the [A]rticles of
[C]onfederation, and probably omitted it, to avoid those embar-
rassments.”209  This understanding of the historical background
of the Tenth Amendment, consistent with Madison’s intentions
and propensity not to restrict federal powers, justified Marshall’s
exposition of implied powers into the Necessary and Proper
200 Lipner, supra  note 177, at 923.
201 Id.  at 924.
202 See  Sprick, supra  note 2, at 536.
203 Madison, supra  note 120, at 229.
204 Sprick, supra  note 2, at 572.
205 JAMES MADISON, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments
(June 8, 1789), in JAMES MADISON:  WRITINGS 437, 451 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
206 See id.  at 447.
207 See id.
208 See  Sprick, supra  note 2, at 536.
209 Id.
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Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland .210  In McCulloch , Marshall
explicitly proclaimed the Tenth Amendment “merely declara-
tory,” as it reserved no affirmative power to the states that had
not previously been retained without the amendment.211
Marshall’s Madisonian approach toward the Tenth Amend-
ment is not entirely surprising, because Madison tutored John
Marshall on the Constitution during the Virginia ratifying con-
vention.212  Furthermore, both Madison and Marshall “believed
that the essential purpose of the Constitution was to abridge the
state sovereignties, to prevent the flagrant abuses committed by
factious majorities in the state legislatures that were so prevalent
in the 1780s.”213  A determination that the Tenth Amendment
was “merely declaratory” was persuasively bolstered by the fol-
lowing:  first, the Tenth Amendment was adopted with the words
“expressly” and “clearly” noticeably absent, and, second, even
some of the most staunch supporters of the Tenth Amendment
conceded the existence of implied powers.  As a matter of fact,
Jefferson yielded in the debate over the existence and desirability
of implied powers, reasoning that despite the fact that the federal
government was “directed to particular objects, . . . even if the
government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary
powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a
certain extent.”214  Therefore, with principal representatives of
individualist, moderate, and nationalist thought agreeing to the
necessity of implied powers upon adoption, it would be inher-
ently problematic, and inconsistent with history, to subsequently
read the term “expressly” into the Tenth Amendment, annihilat-
ing the existence of those implied powers.
Embracing the Madisonian approach, which ruled the day
upon ratification of the Tenth Amendment, one must ask, what
mechanism was constructed to rectify egregious federal over-ex-
pansions?  Madison, loyal to the constitutional structure of
American government, depended on the political process,
namely elections, to remedy federal abuses of power.215  There-
fore, as noted earlier, if federal aggrandizement were to reach a
210 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
211 Id.  at 363.
212 Garry Willis, Introduction  to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS viii, xi (Garry Willis
ed., 1982).
213 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 208.
214 Mayer, supra  note 52, at 348-49.
215 See  Madison, supra  note 120, at 230.
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level offensive to society, the citizenry has the constitutional pro-
tections of both limited terms for elected officials, and, more im-
portantly, the elections themselves to change federal policy.216
While cautioning that too frequent a recourse to the people may
breed popular mistrust of the Constitution,217 Madison con-
cluded that
the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found,
resides in the people alone; and that it will not depend merely
on the comparative ambition or address of the different gov-
ernments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to
enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other.218
Perhaps the most striking quality of this remedial measure, and
certainly the most objectionable to those of the minority position
on an issue,219 is the politicalization of federalism.  Instead of dis-
tinct structural boundaries between state and federal control, the
Madisionian constitutional approach leaves the division of power
in the hands of the people.220  Consequently, federalism issues
not otherwise enveloped in a specific constitutional protection
are subject to the whimsical ebbs and flows of public opinion.
216 See id.
217 MCCOY, supra  note 23, at 48.
218 Madison, supra  note 123, at 237-38.
219 The minority position is a viewpoint that is currently contrary to the dominant
societal position on a given issue.  A recourse to the electoral process will likely
prove an unsatisfactory solution to those supporting the minority position, as the
minority position is likely to suffer defeat at the ballot box.  For example, at the
national level, 57% of Americans believe that abortion should be legal in certain
situations; therefore, anti-abortion advocates wisely argue that the abortion debate
is most appropriately waged at the state level, where, in many states, anti-abortion
sentiment retains a more favorable status among the citizenry.  The Gallup Organi-
zation, Public Opinion About Abortion-–An In-Depth Review , at  http://www.gallup.
com/poll/specialReport/pollSummaries/sr020122iii.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
Accordingly, the federalism debate adopts a peculiar dynamic, where “politicians
adroitly chang[e] sides when it suits their political needs and their positions in gov-
ernment.”  Garrett Epps, The Opportunist’s Friend (and Foe):  States’ Rights , N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2001), available at  http://college3.nytimes.com/guest/articles/2001/
11/20/883846.xml.
Professor Epps correctly recognizes that all people are hypocrites when it comes
to states’ rights, because a person’s stance on federalism will be colored by his or her
position on the underlying issue. Id.  In other words, those whose position com-
mands a majority at the national level are more likely to seek federal protection for
their views, while those in the minority, perhaps better represented at the state level,
will protest federal intervention on issues that are “more appropriately” resolved by
the individual states. See id.  Essentially, Professor Epps concludes, “[w]hen it suits
our leaders, they are in favor of broad federal power; when it does not, they claim
‘states’ rights.’” Id.
220 See  Madison, supra  note 120, at 230.
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Nevertheless, the Tenth Amendment, as historically adopted, was
not intended to act as a substantive restraint on federal power.
B. Rule of Interpretation vs. Truism
Relegating the Tenth Amendment to a position of mere decla-
ration is problematic for those not predisposed to assuming the
Framers of the Constitution would be so cavalier.221  But, herein
lies a fallacy of the federalism debate:  any attempt to understand
the legal doctrine created by the Tenth Amendment should not
be partitioned from the historical and political context in which it
arose.  Nevertheless, contemporary Anti-Federalists, ignoring the
word’s historical defeat, continue to read “expressly” into the
Tenth Amendment, when, in actuality, the Tenth Amendment is
devoid of any specific limitation that can be used to restrict fed-
eral power.222  For example, during the 1996 presidential elec-
tion, Republican nominee Bob Dole “proudly proclaimed he
carried a copy of the Tenth Amendment . . . in his shirt pocket,”
implying that he would acknowledge greater reserved powers to
the states as originally intended by that amendment.223  Ironi-
cally, Dole’s criticism of the expansion of federal powers may si-
multaneously enunciate an appropriate and inappropriate
remedy to that supposed problem.  While Dole was correct in
suggesting that the contours of federalism could be altered
through the election of officials dedicated to states’ rights, he
mistakenly invoked the Tenth Amendment as a legal restriction
on the federal government’s expansion.
Instead, courts must look to other substantive clauses, such as
the Commerce Clause, to determine if a governmental action
reaches beyond the proper exercise of federal power.  This reve-
lation led Justice Stone, in United States v. Darby , to famously, or
infamously, depending upon one’s persuasion, chime that the
Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which
221 See  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).  Justice Thomas, rejecting the notion that the Tenth Amendment lacks
an actual reservation of powers to the states, declared “[t]here would have been no
reason to provide that where the Constitution is silent about whether a particular
power resides at the state level, it might or might not do so.” Id.  However, Justice
Thomas neglects to consider the political obstacle faced by the Federalists, and their
attempts to blunt the practical impact of the Tenth Amendment by withholding the
language that would enable it to act as an enforceable limitation to federal power.
See  discussion infra  Part III.A.
222 Sprick, supra  note 2, at 537.
223 Id.  at 529.
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has not been surrendered.”224  The Tenth Amendment should be
interpreted in conjunction with the rest of the Constitution, re-
quiring that all federal powers be predicated upon specific provi-
sions within the Constitution.225  In essence, the Constitution
determines the boundaries of federalism by defining the powers
bestowed upon the federal government, while utilization of those
powers, discretionary to the political branches, remains subject to
a structural check at the ballot box.
Despite their historically inaccurate venture to read substan-
tive restrictions into the Tenth Amendment, modern states’
rights advocates possess a valid grievance with the tremendous
federal expansion in the post-New Deal era.  The limitations
once placed upon the federal government, as one concerned
scholar noted, are “extinct like the great auk,” because the ad-
vent of the Civil War Amendments and New Deal jurisprudence
have enabled the federal government to swell to previously
unimaginable levels.226  For instance, the Civil War Amend-
ments-–the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments-
–expanded the federal government’s power by providing it with
the ability to guard the rights of individual United States citizens
from invasion by the states.227  As a result, the federal govern-
ment’s paternalistic protection of individual rights has eroded
state sovereignty by restricting regulation in constitutionally pro-
tected areas, such as abortion228 and contraception.229  Further-
more, the ascendancy of New Deal politics, characterized by the
growth of federal regulation over business and industry in re-
sponse to fledgling economic markets, induced inventive con-
gressional manipulations of the Commerce Clause.230  The
federal commerce power became virtually unrestrained from
1937 to 1995, as any law that regulated an activity “in” or “affect-
ing” interstate commerce was, in effect, rubber stamped as an
appropriate exercise of federal power.231  Such augmentations of
the Commerce Clause, when coupled with the Supreme Court’s
refusal to adhere to the restrictive limitations of prior precedent,
224 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
225 Sprick, supra  note 2, at 544.
226 Lipner, supra  note 177, at 917.
227 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra  note 173, at 423.
228 See generally  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
229 See generally  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
230 See  Lipner, supra  note 177, at 912.
231 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra  note 173, at 206.
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produced a congressional commerce power that is basically
plenary.232
Under the Anti-Federalist interpretation, the Tenth Amend-
ment is a “reaffirmation of the internal limitations imposed by
the concept of delegated powers,” giving “the internal limitation
doctrine an external mechanism for enforcement.”233  Accord-
ingly, it is suggested that the Tenth Amendment should be under-
stood to create a rule for interpreting the constitutional division
of power established by federalism, enabling courts to void fed-
eral aggrandizements as repugnant to the Tenth Amendment.234
Moreover, Professor David N. Mayer has adopted the position
that in “American constitutional history, . . . ‘from the presidency
of Jefferson to that of Abraham Lincoln, the consensus was that
Jefferson had been right in calling the Tenth Amendment the
foundation of the constitutional union.’”235  Mayer’s position
suggests a consensus was built within constitutional scholarship,
or perhaps within the Supreme Court, that embraced Jefferson’s
predilection for interpreting the Tenth Amendment as affording
the federal government only those powers expressly enumerated
in the Constitution.236
Mayer’s argument, however, ignores the political and historical
circumstances surrounding the Tenth Amendment’s adoption
and existence.  First, as previously discussed, Anti-Federalist at-
tempts to have the word “expressly” included in the amendment
plainly failed, succumbing to Madison’s more pragmatic concep-
tion of implied powers.  Thus, any post hoc judicial venture to
read the word “expressly” into the amendment would amount to
an activist attempt to implement a political position contrary to
the Framers’ original intent.  Secondly, Mayer’s belief that a con-
232 See  Lipner, supra  note 177, at 912.
233 William T. Barrante, States Rights and Personal Freedom Breathing Life Into
the Tenth Amendment , 63 CONN. B.J. 262, 279 (1989).
234 Mayer, supra  note 52, at 343.  However, using the Tenth Amendment as a rule
for interpreting the constitutional breakdown of federalism is inherently problem-
atic, because the determination that the federal government exceeded its constitu-
tional grant of power will be dependent upon interpretations of the substantive
clauses, not any concrete restriction by the Tenth Amendment.  In other words, the
substantive clauses of the Constitution, like the Commerce Clause, will inevitably
determine the appropriate breadth of federal power under federalism.  Thus, the
understanding of the Tenth Amendment as a “truism” is bolstered, as the federal
government may only exercise those powers emanating from the substantive clauses
that grant it the power to act.
235 Id.  at 361.
236 See id.
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sensus formed during the nineteenth century in support of Jeffer-
son’s limitation of federal powers to their express enumerations
neglects the Marshall Court’s clearest articulations of the extent
of federal powers, namely McCulloch v. Maryland .  Although
Mayer considers McCulloch  an anomaly in the Marshall Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence, Marshall’s conclusion that the fed-
eral government has implied powers to effectuate the responsi-
bilities it had been expressly granted remains a fundamental and
foundational constitutional principle.237 McCulloch  clearly es-
poused the nationalism present on the Marshall Court.238  Fur-
thermore, placed in the weakest branch of government upon the
Constitution’s founding and facing skepticism from states’ rights
advocates that feared legislation from an unelected judiciary,239
the Marshall Court prudently refrained from taking continuous
swipes at state sovereignty.  Systematic escalations of federal
power, at the expense of the states, could have threatened the
Court’s legitimacy.  Instead, the Marshall Court was forced, po-
litically, to carefully select the cases in which it would challenge
the doctrine of states’ rights, as nationalist decisions often met
overt defiance from the political branches.240
Although the populist movements experienced during the Jef-
fersonian and Jacksonian eras undoubtedly exhibited strong ma-
jorities for states’ rights philosophies,241 nationalism endured as
mainstream opposition.  As the minority political ideology, na-
tionalism would have to wait until the twentieth century, under
the New Deal, to experience the political clout necessary to fully
utilize Marshall’s conception of implied powers on a grander
scale.  Said differently, it took the societal shift toward national-
ism, as the majority position, before it became politically and
constitutionally en vogue to recognize expanded federal powers.
That expansion, arguably, has employed an interpretation of the
Commerce Clause that infringes on traditional state powers, to-
tally eclipsing the level of federal control originally intended by
237 See id.  at 363.  The reader would be hard pressed to find a constitutional law
course or casebook in America that does not include McCulloch v. Maryland .
238 HOBSON, supra  note 36, at 10.
239 See id.  at 49.
240 Id.  at 178-79.  Upon the Court’s invalidation of a state law, President Andrew
Jackson was alleged to have said, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him
enforce it.” Id.
241 See PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD:  SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD
RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 187 (1997).
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the Framers, either by enumeration or implication.242  Moreover,
there has been increased recognition that “Congress should not
be permitted to interfere in any of the States’ ‘reserved powers’
simply by calling the activity it wants to regulate ‘commerce.’”243
In fact, Professor Lawrence Tribe, in discussing the federal com-
merce power, observed, “[i]f states are to have any real meaning,
Congress must also be prevented from acting in ways that would
leave a state formally intact but functionally a gutted shell.”244
While this Comment is not designed to thoroughly analyze and
debate the role of the Commerce Clause under the American
constitutional system, suffice it to say that a legitimate argument
can be made that the commerce power has far exceeded its in-
tended utility.  Yet, even accepting this premise as established,
for the sake of the current argument, to contemporaneously
ascribe the Tenth Amendment a role as a substantive limitation
on federal powers not only is contrary to the Framers’ intent
upon ratification, but, more importantly, assails the constitu-
tional protections already provided.  Federalism’s proper linea-
ment, not wholly state or federal, is a query to be resolved largely
by the political process.  In the words of Madison, “powers are
not given to any particular set of men—they are in the hands of
the people—delegated to their representatives chosen for short
terms . . . .”245  As a consequence of republican democracy, the
political process affords government the opportunity to stay
abreast of societal changes and needs.  Moreover, the judicial ac-
tivism promulgated by modern states’ rights advocates, creating a
new limitation on federal power through the Tenth Amendment,
primarily designed to check the expansion of the Commerce
Clause, abdicates the American governmental blueprint of “rule
by elected individuals, rather than unelected judges.”246
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority , the
Supreme Court correctly acknowledged that the Tenth Amend-
ment was not judicially enforceable by stating that “[i]f there are
to be limits on the Federal Government’s power to interfere with
state functions—as undoubtedly there are—we must look else-
242 See  Mayer, supra  note 52, at 376.
243 Barrante, supra  note 233, at 273.
244 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 310 (1978).
245 JAMES MADISON, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788),
in JAMES MADISON:  WRITINGS, supra  note 205, at 354, 358.
246 Lauricella, supra  note 50, at 1407.
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where to find them.”247  Under the rubric of limiting the federal
commerce power, there appear but two adequate solutions:  first,
allowing the political process to reflect societal needs and desires
by the election of representatives poised to confine the federal
government’s control; and, second, judicially restricting the com-
merce power to a level more congruent with the Framers’ origi-
nal intentions.  Under the first scenario, it is emphatically the
responsibility of political parties, activist groups, and state offi-
cials to expose federal encroachments on state domain to the
public.  States’ rights advocates maintain the ability to restrict,
and possibly even retract, federal expansion through a well-com-
municated campaign to educate the populous on the virtues of
state and local control.  To the second scenario, the Supreme
Court, while having to negotiate almost seventy years of hostile
precedent, can breach the doctrine of stare decisis by restricting
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  The federal
commerce power should, arguably, no longer be interpreted as
plenary.  As one scholar suggests, “[I]t is time that the Supreme
Court rein in the Commerce Clause so that it regulates only what
is truly commerce.”248
The judicial invention of the Tenth Amendment as a substan-
tive limitation on federal powers, on the other hand, constitutes
an inappropriate remedy to combat what may be deemed an in-
appropriate expansion of federal power.  Accordingly, the sub-
stantive limitation solution should fall in a constitutionally
equivalent category to the aphorism “two wrongs don’t make a
right.”  While states’ rights advocates, adopting the Jeffersonian
perspective, argue that the essential purpose of a written consti-
tution is to restrain government,249 the Constitution was the
Framers’ attempt to strengthen federal powers as a remedial re-
sponse to a fledgling Articles of Confederation.  Additionally, it
seems probable the Framers’ created a written constitution, in
part, because that precedent had previously been established by
the Articles of Confederation,250 and only a new document could
replace it.
In United States v. Lopez , Justice Kennedy correctly depicted
the historical intentions of Federalists, whose constitutional inter-
247 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985).
248 Barrante, supra  note 233, at 278.
249 Mayer, supra  note 52, at 416.
250 McAffee, supra  note 30, at 33.
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pretations found favor during the ratification of both the Consti-
tution and the Bill of Rights, claiming that questions of
constitutional federalism would be better left to the political pro-
cess rather than the Court.251  If, as Madison suggests, history
and precedent truly are the touchstones of constitutional inter-
pretation, then the Tenth Amendment must remain a gutted relic
from our confederate past.  Although its role as a rhetorical re-
minder of the structural limitations of federal power should be
preserved, the Amendment should not become a judicially in-
vented external mechanism for enforcing the internal limitations
doctrine of delegated powers.  Instead, federalism should remain
a doctrine designed to facilitate societal change through the polit-
ical process.  The great vice and virtue of federalism is its flexibil-
ity, which is predicated upon the maturation and evolution of the
public’s aspirations for society.
CONCLUSION
The nineteenth century French political scientist Alexis de
Tocqueville noted “[t]he first difficulty which Americans had to
face was how to divide sovereignty so that the various states . . .
continued to govern themselves in everything to do with internal
prosperity but . . . the Union should still be a unit and should
provide for all general needs.”252  Federalism is a structural con-
cept designed to facilitate that division between the federal and
state governments.  However, in the founding generation’s en-
deavor to establish a federal system, it was unable to develop a
unified consensus as to how governmental powers should be
split.  The Founding Fathers were men of very different back-
grounds and beliefs, who “disagreed violently with one another”
about the role the state and federal governments should assume
under the newly formed constitutional system.253  As a result,
federalism developed as an amorphous doctrine, characterized,
at best, by the definition society temporally accords it.  Regard-
less, vagary has become a virtue, as the undefined boundaries of
federalism have enabled American government to respond to the
evolution of society.  Tocqueville recognized “[i]t was impossible
to define in advance, completely and exactly, the share of author-
251 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
252 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
Harper Perennial 1969) (1966).
253 Lipner, supra  note 177, at 915.
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ity which should go to each of these governments dividing the
sovereignty,” because “[w]ho could foresee every detail of a na-
tion’s life?”254  What was foreseeable, at least to Madison, was
that changes in society, both through modernization and social
beliefs, would require society’s ability to adapt.
While any attempt to ascertain a single original intent for the
boundaries of federalism is a futile undertaking, the historical
documentation of the founding generation can and should be
used to cultivate a constitutional interpretation that remains gen-
uine to the political and historical lessons the Framers had
learned.  With that objective in mind, the following conclusions
can be drawn concerning proper understanding of federalism.
First, the Constitution was the founding generation’s attempt to
rectify the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation by
granting the federal government greater powers, in an attempt to
create a collective interest among the states, and to preserve the
Union.  Second, in the stratification of federalism between indi-
vidualism, on the one extreme, and nationalism, on the other, the
Constitution was adopted in a spirit of moderation, represented
by the pragmatic design and compromises made by its principle
architect, James Madison.  Third, the general scope of federalism,
made ambiguous through the vague language of the constitu-
tional clauses empowering the federal government and the im-
portation of the implied powers doctrine, is appropriately
determined by the citizenry through the political process.  Fi-
nally, the Tenth Amendment, principally implemented as a rhe-
torical political appeasement to Anti-Federalists, fails to
constitute a substantive limitation on federal power.
254 TOCQUEVILLE, supra  note 252, at 114.
